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#2A-7/10/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondents, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8071 
DeWITT E. THOMPSON, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
DeWitt E. Thompson filed a charge on March 30, 1985 
against the Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New York (District) and the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT). It specified that the District committed an 
improper practice in that it refused to ameliorate an unsafe 
working environment and that UFT committed an improper 
practice in that it refused to assist him in the filing of a 
grievance. 
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the 
specification against the District on the ground that this 
Board lacks jurisdiction over a claim that the working 
environment is unsafe. He dismissed the specification 
against UFT on the ground that: 
[t]he record establishes that Thompson never 
requested that UFT. file or assist his filing 
a grievance . . . . It appears, moreover, 
that the UFT responded to every request by 
Thompson in a manner which cannot be faulted 
in this record. 
1C468 
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The ALJ's decision was served upon Thompson on March 24, 
1986. Three days later, Thompson wrote a letter to this 
Board requesting an extension of time in which to file 
exceptions to the decision of the ALJ. In doing so, he did 
not comply with §204.12 of our Rules of Procedure which 
provides that: 
[a] party requesting an extension of time 
shall notify all the parties to the 
proceeding of its request and shall indicate 
to the Board the position of every other 
party with regard to such request. 
However, in consideration of the fact that Thompson was 
appearing pro se and there was still sufficient time for the 
appropriate inquiries to be directed to the other parties, a 
member of our staff made those inquiries on his behalf. This 
having been done, Thompson was advised on April 10, 1986 that 
his request for an extension of time during which to file 
exceptions was granted and that his exceptions would: 
be considered timely if mailed or delivered 
to the Public Employment Relations Board not 
later than May 5. 1986, with a copy served 
upon the other parties on the same day. 
No such exceptions were received. Instead, on June 18, 
1986, Thompson wrote to this Board requesting a further 
extension of time in which to file exceptions. He indicated 
that he had not filed the exceptions within the time 
originally granted to him because he had been preoccupied with 
other litigation and that the effects of this litigation were 
exacerbated by UFT's failure to represent him in such 
litigation. 
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Section 204.12 of our Rules of Procedure provides that 
we may extend the time during which a party may request an 
extension of time because of extraordinary circumstances. We 
treat Thompson's letter of June 18, 1986 as a motion for a 
further extension of time because of extraordinary 
circumstances, but we deny that motion. Preoccupation with 
other litigation may be sufficient grounds for the granting 
of an extension of time in which to prepare and file 
exceptions. It is not. however, such an extraordinary 
circumstance as would prevent a timely request for 
extension.^ 
1/Compare UFT (Thompson), 18 PERB 1f3014 (1985). in 
which a request by Thompson in an earlier case for an 
extension of time because of extraordinary circumstances 
was denied. Thompson had alleged that the District had 
harassed him at the time when he should have requested the 
extension and that he was further disconcerted by UFT's 
failure to support him in his charge against the District. 
We denied his motion on the ground that the reasons for it 
were not such extraordinary circumstances as would have 
reasonably interfered with the filing of timely 
exceptions. See also Westbury UFSD. 12 PERB 1f3107 (1979), 
in which a vacation was not deemed such an extraordinary 
circumstance, and Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of Mew York. 16 PERB ir3051 (1983). in 
which physical injury which did not actually incapacitate 
the individual requesting an extension was not such an 
extraordinary circumstance. On the other hand, in Auburn 
Industrial Development Authority. 15 PERB 1[3075 (1982), we 
found extraordinary circumstances where the attorney who 
should have filed exceptions had become mentally and 
emotionally ill and had been incapacitated from requesting 
an extension. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the request herein be. and 
it hereby is. denied. 
DATED: July 10, 1986 
Albany. New York 
rfkrZJ? IK. 4L#^<^&^-^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman. Cha i rman 
U_ A r-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2B-7/10/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF CLINTON and SHERIFF OF 
COUNTY OF CLINTON, 
Respondents, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8547 
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S UNIT, LOCAL 810, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC.. LOCAL 1000, AFSCME. AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES (ANTHONY DI ROCCO, of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (PAULINE R. KINSELLA, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Deputy 
Sheriff's Unit, Local 810, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its charge that the 
County of Clinton and Sheriff of County of Clinton (Joint 
Employer) violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law by not 
extending the terms of an expired agreement covering unit 
employees. Allegedly, the Joint Employer refused to provide 
10472 
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a scheduled holiday and the payment of scheduled salary 
increments. The Director dismissed the charge on the ground 
that the facts alleged do not make out a prima facie case 
because §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor law does not apply to the 
relationship between CSEA and the Joint Employer. 
FACTS 
CSEA had long represented a unit of persons employed in 
a two-employer bargaining unit, one employer being Clinton 
County and the other employer being the County and the 
Sheriff as a joint employer. The two employers and CSEA were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement scheduled to 
expire on December 31, 1985, when, on April 10, 1985, CSEA 
asked the two employers to consent to a split of the unit so 
that there would be two units, one covering the employees of 
each employer. The request was denied and CSEA filed a 
petition for decertification of the existing unit and its 
certification in a separate unit of the employees of the 
Joint Employer. This petition was granted over the objection 
of the employers and CSEA was certified in the Sheriff's 
Department unit on October 4, 1985.— There was no 
certification of CSEA in the residual unit, its status as the 
representative of that unit never having been questioned. 
•^County of Clinton and Sheriff of County of Clinton. 
18 PERB 1f3070. 
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The collective bargaining agreement in effect between 
CSEA and the two employers at that time contained general 
provisions covering the unit as a whole and other provisions 
that were applicable exclusively to employees in the 
Sheriff's Department. Both the County and the Joint Employer 
continued to abide by the terms of that agreement between 
October 4, 1985 and the expiration of that agreement on 
December 31. 1985. 
After December 31, 1985, the charge alleges, the Joint 
Employer refused to comply with the provisions of the expired 
2/ agreement dealing with holidays and salary increments.— 
The Director concluded that this would not constitute a 
violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. He reasoned that 
the Joint Employer was not obligated by the Law to maintain 
the terms of the expired agreement with respect to the 
Sheriff's Department unit because there was no substantial 
continuity in the negotiating relationship linking CSEA and 
the Joint Employer to the parties to the expired agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
The right of an employee organization to negotiate with 
a public employer is set forth in §204 of the Taylor Law. 
2/For the purposes of this review of the decision of 
the Director that the facts alleged did not make out a 
prima facie case, we must assume those allegations to be 
true. 
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J 
Subdivision 3 of that section indicates that this right is "to 
negotiate collectively." This implies that the primary right 
to negotiate inheres in the group of employees who 
"collectively" constitute a negotiating unit, and that the 
right of a recognized or certified employee organization 
derives from the primary right of the "collective" that it 
- 1/ represents. 
A consequence of this is that if one employee 
organization succeeds another as the representative of a 
negotiating unit while a collective bargaining agreement 
covering that unit is still in effect, the agreement continues 
to bind the public employer, and the new employee organization 
) succeeds to the rights and obligations of its predecessor. In 
effect, there has been a custodial transfer of the negotiating 
unit from one employee organization to another which carries 
with it the collective bargaining agreement which is the 
4/ property of such negotiating unit.— On the other hand, 
where there has been a significant change in the composition 
of a negotiating unit, the rights and obligations of the 
public employer and the employee organization set forth in a 
collective bargaining agreement between them are 
3./Thus, in Fraternal Order of Mew York State 
Troopers, 5 PERB 1F3060 (1972), aff'd, PBA v. He Is by, 73 
Misc.2d 184, 6 PERB 1F7001 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1973). we said 
(at p. 3106): "The authority of an employee organization is 
derivative and not independent; it derives from the 
employees who select it and whom it represents." 
4/Fraternal Order of New York State Troopers, supra. 
• 10475 
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5/ terminated.- This is because the "collective" of 
employees, on whose behalf the agreement was negotiated, has 
ceased to exist. Neither of the two units is a successor to 
the old unit. 
The termination of an agreement because one of the 
parties to it has ceased to exist has different consequences 
from the expiration of an agreement by its own terms. No 
contract rights survive the termination of an agreement, and 
§209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law does not compel a public 
employer to abide by them.—' 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director 
and WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 10. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
5/Accretions to a negotiating unit or such changes as 
would be affected by a petition for unit clarification or 
placement under §201.2(b) of our Rules are not significant 
changes in a unit. 
6/Unilateral changes by a public employer of the 
terms and conditions of employment of unit employees would, 
nevertheless, constitute a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law even where there was no relevant prior .>• 
agreement. Livingston. Steuben. Wyoming BOCES, 8 PERB 
1f3019 (1975). 
0 
#2C-7/lO/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-85 67 
TOWN OF POTSDAM. 
Charging Party. 
ROCCO A. DePERNO. ESQ. (FREDERICK W. MURAD. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
INGRAM, INGRAM. CAPPELLO & LINDEN. P.C. (FRANCIS P. 
CAPPELLO, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Town of Potsdam (Town) and Teamsters Local 687 
(Local 687) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement 
which expired on December 31, 1985, and no new agreement has 
been negotiated by the parties. Article 15 of that expired 
agreement provides:— 
Article 15: Resolution of Deadlocks in 
Collective Negotiations 
15.1: The parties agree to conduct meetings 
for the purpose of collective bargaining 
during the period of one hundred and twenty 
1/Notwithstanding the expiration of the agreement, 
its terms still apply. Section 209-a.l(e) of the Taylor 
Law. 
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) 
(120) days prior to any fiscal budget year 
for the purposes of attempting to mutually 
agree upon amendments to this Agreement. 
15.2: The parties hereby agree that an 
impasse in such negotiations shall be 
identified by the failure of the parties to 
have achieved an understanding or agreement 
sixty (60) days prior to the date of the 
vote on the annual budget. 
15.3: In the event of an impasse, the 
parties agree to submit the unresolved issue 
to the Public Employees (sic) Relations 
Board for mediation and/or factfinding. In 
the event the unresolved issues are not 
settled by mediation and/or factfinding, 
such issues shall be submitted to a Public 
Employees Relations Board arbitrator for a 
final and binding decision. 
Local 687 insists that the provision for binding interest 
arbitration be included in the new agreement, and the Town 
• alleges that such insertion is an improper practice because 
interest arbitration is not a mandatory subject of 
2/ 
negotiation.— The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found 
merit in this charge and the matter now comes to us on the 
exceptions of Local 687. 
Local 687 first argues that the demand for interest 
arbitration is a mandatory subject of negotiation because it 
would apply only to substantive demands which are themselves 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Town responds that 
both the demand, on its face, and Local 687's past 
negotiation posture has been for interest arbitration of all 
2/See Monroe Woodbury Teachers Association. 10 PERB 
1F3029 (1977). 
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substantive negotiation demands whether or not they are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. We find it unnecessary to 
4/ 
resolve this dispute.— The Town's alternative argument 
is that a demand for interest arbitration is not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation even if the interest arbitration is 
limited to substantive proposals that are themselves 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. We agree with this 
proposition. 
A recognized or certified employee organization is given 
a statutory right to negotiate terms and conditions of 
5/ 
employment.— Section 209 of the Taylor Law governs the 
process of such negotiations. Subdivision 2 of §209 
authorizes parties to enter into written agreements setting 
forth procedures for the resolution of negotiation impasses 
but a distinction must be made between such agreements and 
agreements on terms and conditions of employment. If no 
agreement is reached in collective negotiations, the terms 
and conditions which will govern the employment relationship 
will be those set forth in the parties' expired agreement, if 
6 / 
any;— the existing practices to the extent that there is 
^/in the past we have permitted a party to amend its 
demand in the face of a charge that such demand is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. Amherst Police Club. 
Inc.. 12 PERB 1P071 (1979). 
^./Sections 204.2 and §208.1(a) of the Taylor Law. 
^./Section 209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. 
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7/ 
no prior agreement; a determination by the legislative body 
8/ 
of certain types of governments;— and, in the case of police 
9/ 
and fire fighters, an interest arbitration award.— However, 
notwithstanding the variety of procedures that are made 
available to resolve negotiation impasses, the underlying 
public policy is that public "employers and employee 
organizations should reach agreements with respect to terms and 
conditions of employment. 
Agreements regarding the process of negotiations are of a 
different character. There is no public policy that public 
employers and employee organizations should enter into such 
agreements. On the contrary, subdivisions 3 & 4 of §209 of the 
Taylor Law provide a comprehensive negotiation process. 
Subdivision 2 of §209 merely affords public employers and 
employee organizations the opportunity to devise alternative 
negotiation procedures for their own use. No public employer 
or employee organization is under a statutory duty to negotiate 
with respect to such alternative procedures.—' 
Z/Livinqston. Steuben. Wyoming BOCES. 8 PERB 1F3019 
(1975). 
.^/Section 209.3(e) of the Taylor Law. 
^/Section 209.4 of the Taylor Law. 
10/Town of Shelter Island. 12 PERB 1P112 (1979). 
Also, compare §200(b), which requires public employers to 
negotiate with employee organizations, with §200(c). which 
only encourages them to agree upon dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Board - U-8567 -5 
Our conclusion that a demand for interest arbitration 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiation is consistent with 
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and various 
courts in the private sector.— 
Local 687 argues further that, even though interest 
arbitration may not be a mandatory subject of negotiation 
generally, the clause herein is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation because it has a direct and immediate bearing on 
the employment relationship. This argument is based upon a 
misconstruction of an NLRB decision holding that an employer 
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to abide by 
an agreement to arbitrate a current interest dispute and, 
1?/ 
instead, unilaterally implemented its last wage offer.^ *1—' 
That case is distinguishable, however, in that there was no 
demand to negotiate for interest arbitration. Rather, the 
parties had agreed to interest arbitration of a current 
impasse and the employer reneged on that agreement. Under 
3il/NLRB V. Massachusetts Nurses Association. 557 F.2d 
894 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers 
International, etc., 575 F.2d 394. 98 LRRM 2147 (2d Cir. 
1978); NLRB v. Greensboro Printing Pressmen and Assistants 
Union, 549 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Columbus 
Printing Pressmen & Assistants. 543 F.2d 1161. 93 LRRM 3055 
(5th Cir. 1976); Sheet Metal Workers v. Aldrich Air 
Conditioning, Inc.. 717 F.2d 456. 114 LRRM 2657 (8th Cir. 
1983); Sheet Metal Workers. Local 252 v. Standard Sheet 
Metal. Inc.. 699 F.2d 481, 112 LRRM 2878 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12/Sea Bay Manor Home. 253 NLRB 73 9. 106 LRRM 1010 
(1980). enf.. NLRB v. Sea Bay Manor Home. 685 F.2d 425, 111 
LRRM 2608 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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those limited circumstances, the NLRB found that the 
agreement to submit the current dispute to interest 
arbitration had taken on the characteristics of the 
substantive mandatory subjects of negotiation that were then 
being negotiated. 
Local 687 also argues that the demand herein is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation because it would insert the 
interest arbitration clause in an amendment to an existing 
collective bargaining agreement and not in "a contract yet 
to be formed." It is not clear what Local 687 means by this 
argument. Apparently it is contending that interest 
arbitration can be used to perpetuate interest arbitration 
clauses by the expedient of treating contract renewals as 
merely constituting contract amendments. Thus, in effect, 
according to Local 687, once parties have agreed to an 
interest arbitration clause, its perpetuation is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. We reject this argument. We have 
long held that incorporation of permissive subjects of 
negotiation into an agreement does not convert them into 
13/ 
mandatory subjects for future negotiations.— 
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ and WE ORDER Local 687 to cease and 
desist from insisting upon negotiations for the inclusion of 
13/Troy UFFA, 10 PERB 1P015 (1977). 
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an interest arbitration clause in a collective bargaining 
agreement to succeed its agreement with the Town that 
expired on December 31, 1985. 
DATED: July 10, 1986 
Albany, New York 
£U^£? 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-8325 
SCHENECTADY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
BUCHYN, O'HARE & WERNER. ESQS.. for Respondent 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Schenectady (City) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) that it violated the Taylor Law by unilaterally 
imposing a procedure for the application for benefits under 
General Municipal Law §207-c upon employees in a negotiating 
unit represented by Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association (PBA). Section 207-c of the General Municipal 
Law provides for the payment of the full amount of regular 
salaries and wages to policemen who sustain an injury or 
illness resulting from the performance of their duties. In 
the case of a policeman who is permanently disabled, such 
Board - U-8325 -2 
) 
payments continue until the policeman is granted an 
accidental disability retirement allowance upon his own 
application or the application of his employer. 
Among other things, the new procedure imposed by the 
City prescribes time limits for notifying it of the injury or 
illness, techniques for the investigation of §207-c claims, 
including medical examinations, such as would be required for 
the receipt of benefits under the Workers Compensation Law. 
and the appointment of a "risk manager" to monitor the 
process. The failure of a claimant to comply with the 
procedures, to the extent that they are applicable to him, 
precludes the claimant from receiving benefits under §207-c. 
^ The ALJ found that some of the provisions of the new 
procedure involve management prerogatives. These include the 
creation of the position "risk manager" and the establishment 
of procedures to investigate claims made pursuant to §207-c. 
She found that other provisions of the new procedure were 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation because they merely 
reiterated procedural requirements set forth in §207-c. 
However, those provisions which impose new procedural 
requirements that involve the participation of claimants and 
go beyond the terms of the statute were found by the ALJ to 
constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation. To that 
extent, she found the City's unilateral action to violate 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
) 
1Q485 
Board - U-8325 -3 
The City makes four arguments in support of its 
exceptions. The first is that this Board lacks jurisdiction 
over §207-c claimants because, by virtue of their claims, 
they cease to be public employees and are therefore no longer 
covered by the Taylor Law. It supports this argument by 
citing Chalachan v. City of Binqhamton~ for the 
proposition that the status of disabled police officers who 
receive benefits under §207-c "as employees even after 
disability has occurred is strictly a matter of statutory 
2/ 
right."— This, according to the City, means that the 
disabled employees are employees for the purposes of the 
General Municipal Law but not the Taylor Law. 
We do not find Chalachan to be relevant to the issue 
before us. The §207-a beneficiaries in the Chalachan case 
are former employees but not by virtue of the fact that they 
receive benefits under the General Municipal Law. Rather, it 
3/ is because they are retirees.— The Chalachan case is 
therefore consistent with our decision in City of 
1/55 N.Y.2d 989 (1982). 
i/chalachan actually deals with the status and rights 
of fire fighters under General Municipal Law §207-a. but 
for purposes of the issue before us the applicability of 
§207-a to fire fighters and §207-c to police officers are 
parallel. 
3_/The opinion of the Appellate Division states "Each 
of the petitioners either separated from service or was 
retired while in good standing during the year 1979." 
Chalachan v. City of Binqhamton, 81 A.D. 973 (3rd Dep't 
1981). 
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4/ 
Binqhamton.- That decision holds that fire fighters who 
receive benefits under §207-a as a result of line of duty 
injuries continue to be employees of the municipality which 
hired them until they are properly separated from service by 
virtue of voluntary or involuntary retirement. It follows 
that the terms and conditions of disabled employees who have 
not retired are mandatory subjects of negotiation, while 
similar terms and conditions affecting those who have already 
5 / 
retired are permissive subjects of negotiation.— 
In addition to its reliance upon Chalachan. the City 
cites several other court decisions in support of its 
position, but we find that none of these avail it. For 
6 / 
example, Mashnouk v. Miles— and Klonowski v. City of 
7/ Auburn— both deal with retired employees, and Cook v. City 
8 / 
of Binqhamton.— deals with the constitutionality of 
involuntary retirement of disabled employees, an issue that 
is not relevant to the question before us. 
4/10 PERB 1P092 (1977). See also City of Binqhamton. 
12 PERB 1F3089 (1979), aff'd. City of Binqhamton v. Newman. 
13 PERB 1f7005 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1980). 
5/Trov UFFA, 10 PERB 1F3015 (1977); City of Oneida 
PBA. 15 PERB 1[3096 (1982). This, too, is consistent with 
Chalachan. as that decision holds that vacation benefits 
explicitly provided to retired disabled employees by a 
collective bargaining agreement are enforceable. 
6/55 N.Y.2d 80 (1982) . 
2/58 N.Y.2d 398 (1983). 
1/48 N.Y.2d 323 (1979). 1048 
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9/ Elliot v. City of Bmqhaititon ~ comes closest to being 
relevant. It holds that a City did not exceed its authority 
when it promulgated a procedure by which employees could 
claim benefits under §207-c. However, there was no issue in 
that case as to whether the City was obligated to negotiate 
with respect to the promulgation of such procedure. The duty 
to negotiate terms and conditions of employment is applicable 
precisely where a public employer has authority to act and. 
but for the Taylor Law, could have acted unilaterally. There 
is no duty to negotiate where explicit statutory mandates 
dictate conduct to such an extent that a public employer 
cannot impose variations of such conduct.— 
The City's second argument is that the ALJ's decision 
subordinated its constitutional obligations to inconsistent 
Taylor Law obligations. The City's brief does not fully 
articulate the reasoning behind this argument. It merely 
states that the ALJ's decision "would violate constitutional 
prohibitions against . . . unauthorized payments". This 
suggests that the City is arguing that benefits received by 
9/94 A.D.2d 887 (3rd Dep't 1983). aff'd without 
opinion. 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984). 
JQ/Harrison Association of Teachers. 6 PERB 1f3017 
(1973); City of Albany, 7 PERB 1F3078 (1974); Scarsdale PBA. 
8 PERB 1F3075 (1975). See also. Huntington Board of 
Education v. Associated Teachers of Huntington. 30 N.Y.2d 
122. 5 PERB 1F7507 (1972). 
) 
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disabled employees would constitute gifts of public funds 
prohibited by Article 8, §1 of the State Constitution. Such 
an argument must be rejected. Benefits provided as a 
consequence of the negotiation of mandatory or nonmandatory 
but permissive subjects of negotiation do not violate the 
Constitution.— 
The City's third argument is that PBA waived its right 
to negotiate in that it had given PBA sufficient notice of an 
intention to promulgate a rule imposing the new procedure and 
that PBA did not make a timely request to negotiate the 
matter. 
Having reviewed the record, we find that the City gave 
PBA notice of its intention to adopt a new procedure 
unilaterally and of a willingness to negotiate only the 
impact of the new procedure. We further find that PBA's 
response was that it wished to negotiate the substance rather 
than the impact of the new procedure. The City then offered 
to negotiate the substance of the procedure itself, but only 
during a specific two-week period, with the implementation of 
the procedure to take place four days thereafter. Although 
JUL/Huntington v. Teachers, supra. See also Chalachan 
v. City of Binghamton. supra, which indicates that vacation 
benefits may be negotiated even for retirees. 
10489 
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no such negotiations took place during the two-week period, 
this was because PBA's negotiator was not available at that 
time. 
On the basis of these facts, we conclude that PBA did 
12/ 
not waive its right to negotiate— and the City is 
therefore required to do so regarding those aspects of the 
procedures unilaterally adopted by the City which 
13/ 
constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation.— We 
further conclude that the City had made a unilateral 
decision to adopt these procedures and that it was not 
prepared to negotiate that decision in good faith. 
Moreover, even if the offer to negotiate during the 
two-week period evidences a willingness to negotiate in 
good faith, and PBA could be faulted for not commencing 
negotiations during that period, the failure of the parties 
to reach an agreement during that period would not be 
sufficient to justify the unilateral action of the City 
14/ thereafter.— 
12/CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685. 15 PERB TT7011 (3rd 
Dep't 1982). aff'd. 61 N.Y.2d 1001. 17 PERB 117007 (1984). 
13,/The exceptions herein direct no question to the 
ALJ's determination as to which elements of the procedure 
involve mandatory subjects of negotiation and which do not. 
14/Wappingers CSD, 5 PERB 1P074 (1972). and Cohoes 
CSD. 12 PERB 1F3113 (1979). 
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The City's final argument is a technical one. It 
contends that the ALJ erred in not ruling upon its motion 
to dismiss PBA's charge. The City made such a motion and 
the ALJ reserved judgment on it. Eventually, she decided 
the matter in favor of PBA on the merits without having 
explicitly denied the City's motion. This action of the 
ALJ did not prejudice the City. Her decision was an 
implicit denial of the City's motion. 
WOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ that 
the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment of 
employees represented by PBA, and 
^ WE ORDER the City to: 
1. Rescind immediately and cease enforcement or 
implementation of its "207-c procedure" and any 
forms or other documents required pursuant thereto, 
except as to those provisions which create the 
title of "risk manager", allow investigation by the 
City of unit employees' claims under §207-c of the 
General Municipal Law without the participation of 
unit employees or their agents, and/or which 
reiterate specific requirements set forth in §207-c 
of the General Municipal Law; 
J 10491 
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DATED: 
Remove immediately and destroy all reports or other 
documents submitted by unit employees and all 
disciplinary documents issued by the City pursuant 
to the City's "207-c procedure" from any files kept 
or maintained by the City or any of its agents; 
Negotiate in good faith with the Schenectady 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association with respect to 
terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees consistent with its duty under the Taylor 
Law; 
Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations on the City's premises where written 
communications for unit employees are ordinarily 
posted. 
July 10, 1986 
Albany, New York 
~&Co^-?$2 frd YZMy^u^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
10,, 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPL 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the negotiating unit represented 
by the Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Association that the 
City of Schenectady will: 
1. Rescind immediately and cease enforcement or implementation of 
its "207-c procedure" and any forms or other documents 
required pursuant thereto, except as to those provisions which 
create the title of "risk manager", allow investigation by the 
City of unit employees' claims under §207-c of the General 
Municipal Law without the participation of unit employees or 
their agents, and/or which reiterate specific requirements set 
forth in §207-c of the General Municipal Law; 
2. Remove immediately and destroy all reports or other documents 
submitted by unit employees and all disciplinary documents 
issued by the City pursuant to the City's "207-c procedure" 
from any files kept or maintained by the City or any of its 
agents; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Schenectady Patrolmen1s 
Benevolent Association with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees consistent with its duty under 
the Taylor Law. 
City of Schenectady 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
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This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
E 
#3A-7/10/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF PAWLING, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3054 
LOCAL 456. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the
 Oabove-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
o 
Unit: Included: All blue-collar employees of the 
Highway Department. 
Excluded: All other employees 10494 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: July 10, 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman,Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg./Member 
